On March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Rimini Street v. Oracle (available here). At issue was whether the Copyright Act’s provision that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof”, see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (emphasis added), is limited to the six categories of litigation expenses that qualify as “costs” under the general statutes governing awards of costs, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920. (Those six categories are as follows: (i) fees of the clerk and marshal; (ii) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (iii) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (iv) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (v) docket fees; (vi) compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services.)
The Supreme Court found that “full costs” meant those six categories of costs set forth in the general costs statutes, and not expert witness, e-discovery, or jury consulting costs:
The term “full” is a term of quantity or amount; it does not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as “costs” under the general costs statute. In copyright cases, §505’s authorization for the award of “full costs” therefore covers only the six categories specified in the general costs statute, codified at §§1821 and 1920.
As such, the Supreme Court wiped out $12.8 million in “costs” awarded to Oracle for litigation expenses such as expert witness, e-discovery, and jury consulting expenses.
(Note that the Copyright Act also allows the district court to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties: “Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505.)