Magistrate Judge Cureton

Magistrate Judge Cureton became one of the Northern District’s magistrate judges in 2010.  He graduated from Baylor University in 1990 and Baylor University School of Law in 1993, where he was a member of the Baylor Law Review.  Following law school, Judge Cureton clerked for Judge Mahon of the Northern District of Texas (from 1993-1994 and from 1997-2000).  After his first clerkship, Judge Cureton was an associate with Friedman, Young and Suder, P.C. from 1994-1995.  He then served the Forth Worth community as an Assistant District Attorney in Tarrant County.  Following his stint as an Assistant District Attorney and his second clerkship, Judge Cureton was an associate with the Fillmore Law Firm from 2000-2003.  From 2003-2010, Judge Cureton was a partner with the Fort Worth law firm of Cureton & Gordon.

Judge Cureton has also served as an adjunct professor at Texas Wesleyan School of Law, where he taught courses in the area of litigation and trial technique.

Judge Cureton sits in the Northern District’s Fort Worth Division, and his initial term runs through 2018.

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Judge Fish Remands Tran v. Citibank (For the Second Time)

Judge Fish recently issued an order in Tran v. Citibank, sending the case back to state court for the second time.  The plaintiff, Dr. Tran, originally brought suit in state court claiming that Citibank failed to honor his decision to rescind a transaction associated with his medical practice (Dr. Tran purchased electronic equipment for use in his practice, which, according to Dr. Tran, was defective) and, instead, associated with defendant GC Services, a debt collection agency, to collect the debt from him.  Dr. Tran originally brought suit in state court, alleging a violation of, among other things, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Citibank removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.  The case, however, was remanded after Dr. Tran dismissed all of his federal claims.  Following remand, the state court ordered the parties to mediate.  During the mediation, Dr. Tran made an oral demand of more than $87,000 to settle his case.  Citibank then removed the case a second time–this time on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

Dr. Tran filed a motion to remand, arguing that Citibank’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (because the removal was filed “more than 1 year after commencement of the action”) and asserting that Citibank was “prohibited from using the oral ‘communication’ relating to the action ‘made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure’ to prove diversity jurisdiction under the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.073(a)[,]” which provides, with certain exceptions, that “a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure . . . is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.”

Judge Fish ultimately found that the one-year time limit of § 1446(b) barred removal, and remanded the case to state court again.  Judge Fish’s decision did, however, raise three interesting issues.  First, Judge Fish noted, with respect to the oral settlement communication, that it was unclear whether this oral communication could satisfy § 1446(b)’s requirement that the notice of removal be filed within thirty days “after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable[.]”  Judge Fish noted that, “[a]lmost without exception, [courts] have held that the paper required in [section] 1446 must be a part of the underlying suit rather than an outside development in removal jurisdiction.”

The second interesting issue raised by the decision (but not decided by Judge Fish) is whether the oral settlement communication made at the parties’ mediation could be used to demonstrate that the case’s amount in controversy was over $75,000, as is necessary for diversity jurisdiction to exist.  It seems unclear whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.073(a) makes such communications inadmissible in federal court.  Until the courts have sorted this issue out, it may be best to enter into a separate mediation agreement that specifically provides that no party shall use communications occurring in mediation for any purpose, including to establish diversity jurisdiction.

Third, Judge Fish noted that, in certain instances, the one-year time limit in § 1446(b) may be equitably tolled in cases involving a clear pattern of forum manipulation.  In the instant case, however, Judge Fish concluded that Citibank had failed to demonstrate that the one-year time limit should be equitably tolled.

Carl Adams, of The Law Offices of Carl Adams, represents Dr. Tram.  Citibank is represented by Evan Moeller, of Hirsch & Westheimer PC, Brian Morris and Leslie Johnson, both of Winstead PC, and Citibank in-house counsel David Winston.

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Meeting and Conferring (Fully)

Local Rule 7.1(a) requires that, “[b]efore filing a motion [with limited exceptions], an attorney for the moving party must confer with an attorney for each party affected by the requested relief to determine whether the motion is opposed.”  In Marshall d/b/a Mr. Crappie v. Fulton, Judge Lindsay dealt with a motion to extend discovery and counterclaims, as well as Mr. Crappie’s request for sanctions against Fulton.  Judge Lindsay stated, with respect to the Local Rules’ meet and confer requirement:   

[T]he court considers Marshall’s request for sanctions against Fulton.  The evidence presented by Plaintiff establishes that Defendant did not fully confer with him before filing this motion as required by Local Rule 7.1(a), because he did not raise all the requested relief in that conference.  The court will not sanction Fulton; however, he is admonished to comply with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Failure to comply with these rules in the future will lead to sanctions.

This decision servies as a useful reminder that, when conducting a meet and confer pursuant to the Local Rules, make sure to raise all of the issues that you plan to cover in your motion.  Failure to do so could result in sanctions. 

Note that while we were initially confused as to what exactly “Mr. Crappie” was, we have determined that it is a business that sells fishing rods.  Check out its website here, including the Crappie Mobile

The case involves the use of the “Mr. Crappie” trademark.  Mr. Crappie is represented by Darin Klemchuk, Katherine Bandy, and Kelly Kubasta, all of Klemchuk Kubasta LLP.  Fulton is represented by Stephen Kennedy, of Kennedy Clark & Williams PC, and Zachary Groover of Munck Carter LLP.

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5th Circuit Reinstates SEC’s Complaint Against Mark Cuban

In July 2009, Chief Judge Fitzwater of the Northern District of Texas dismissed the SEC’s insider trading complaint against Dallas resident (and owner of the Dallas Mavericks) Mark Cuban, finding that the SEC had not adequately alleged that Cuban undertook a duty of non-use of certain information required to establish liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.  Yesterday, a panel of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Chief Judge Fitzwater’s decision, finding that the SEC’s complaint should not have been dismissed, and that the case against Cuban must proceed to discovery.

A pdf copy of the 5th Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Cuban is here.  The SEC alleges that Cuban—after agreeing to maintain the confidentiality of material, nonpublic information concerning a planned private investment in public equity (“PIPE”) offering by Mama.com—sold his stock in Mamma.com (a Canadian search engine company in which Cuban was a large minority stakeholder) without first disclosing to Mamma.com that he intended to trade on this information, thereby avoiding losses in excess of $750,000 when the stock price declined after the PIPE was publicly announced.

Chief Judge Fitzwater had found that, at most, the complaint alleged an agreement to keep the information confidential, but did not include an agreement not to trade.  According to Chief Judge Fitzwater’s decision, a simple confidentiality agreement was not enough to create a duty to disclose or abstain from trading under the securities laws, and, accordingly, Chief Judge Fitzwater granted Cuban’s motion to dismiss.

The 5th Circuit began its decision by noting that there are two theories of insider trading under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.  The “classical theory” of insider trading “prohibits a ‘corporate insider’ from ‘trading on material nonpublic information obtained from his position within the corporation without disclosing the information.’”  The corporate insider is under a duty to “disclose or abstain,” meaning that “he must tell the shareholders of his knowledge and intention to trade or abstain from trading altogether.”

The second theory, known as the “misappropriation theory,” holds that “a person violates section 10(b) when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”

The 5th Circuit ultimately found that the SEC adequately pled that Cuban was liable under the “misappropriation theory,” given that the SEC’s complaint asserted that Mamma.com’s CEO told Cuban that he had confidential information for him and Cuban agreed to keep whatever information the CEO shared confidential.  The CEO then told Cuban about the PIPE offering, which, according to the SEC, upset Cuban.  The CEO sent Cuban a follow-up e-mail, inviting Cuban to contact Merriman, the investment bank conducting the offering.  Cuban, according to the SEC’s complaint, called the Merriman representative, and, during the call, the representative provided Cuban additional confidential details about the PIPE.  The SEC alleges that, with that information and one minute after speaking with the Merriman representative, Cuban called his broker and instructed the broker to sell Cuban’s entire stake in the company.  Mamma.com’s stock price eventually fell 39% following the public announcement of the PIPE offering.  The 5th Circuit noted that, by selling his share when he did, Cuban avoided over $750,000 in losses.

The 5th Circuit’s decision held in relevant part:

The [SEC’s] allegations, taken in their entirety, provide more than a plausible basis to find that the understanding between the CEO and Cuban was that he was not to trade, that it was more than a simple confidentiality agreement. By contacting the sales representative to obtain the pricing information, Cuban was able to evaluate his potential losses or gains from his decision to either participate or refrain from participating in the PIPE offering.  It is at least plausible that each of the parties understood, if only implicitly, that Mamma.com would only provide the terms and conditions of the offering to Cuban for the purpose of evaluating whether he would participate in the offering, and that Cuban could not use the information for his own personal benefit.  It would require additional facts that have not been put before us for us to conclude that the parties could not plausibly have reached this shared understanding.  Under Cuban’s reading, he was allowed to trade on the information but prohibited from telling others—in effect providing him an exclusive license to trade on the material nonpublic information.  Perhaps this was the understanding, or perhaps Cuban mislead the CEO regarding the timing of his sale in order to obtain a confidential look at the details of the PIPE.  We say only that on this factually sparse record, it is at least equally plausible that all sides understood there was to be no trading before the PIPE.   That both Cuban and the CEO expressed the belief that Cuban could not trade appears to reinforce the plausibility of this reading.

Accordingly, the 5th Circuit vacated Chief Judge Fitzwater’s judgment dismissing the case and remanded the case to Chief Judge Fitzwater for further proceedings, including discovery, consideration of summary judgment, and trial, if appropriate.

Cuban has been (or is currently) represented by a number of highly noted attorneys, including Paul Coggins, of Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP; Thomas Melsheimer, John Sanders, Jr., and Steven Stodghill, all of Fish & Richardson; Christopher Clark, Lyle Roberts, Ralph Ferrara, and Stephen Best, all of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP; Stephen Ryan, of DLA Piper LLP; and Henry Asbill, of Jones Day LLP.

The SEC is represented by Kevin O’Rourke, Adam Aderton, Julie Riewe, Thomas Karr and Toby M Galloway.

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“When You Find Yourself In a Hole, Stop Digging”

Those words come from Judge Lindsay’s recent Order in EsNtion Records v. TM Studios, where Judge Lindsay took up the issue of whether to sanction EsNtion’s attorney for failure to notify the Court that her client had declared bankruptcy.

The facts are as follows:  On August 31, 2010, Judge Lindsay awarded $376,000 in attorney’s fees against EsNtion and in favor of TM Studios after TM Studios prevailed in a copyright lawsuit brought by EsNtion.  On September 2, 2010, the Court’s law clerk received a phone call from TM Studios’ counsel informing the Court that EsNtion had declared bankruptcy in April 2010.   EsNtion’s counsel had not notified the Court of this fact, and the Court ordered her to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for failing to do so.

EsNtion’s counsel filed her response to the Court’s show cause order, and stated that she had not been in contact with her client since February 2010, and that she had only learned of the bankruptcy “recently.”  Judge Lindsay, to put it mildly, was not pleased, writing (after he stayed the enforcement of his attorney’s fee award):

The court now considers [EsNtion’s counsel’s] response to its order.  [EsNtion’s counsel] states repeatedly that she learned of her client’s bankruptcy “recently,” but she fails to provide specific information about when she learned this information.  If she only learned of the bankruptcy when she received the court’s order, she should have been forthcoming with the court.  The court would not sanction her if she had no information about the bankruptcy, but her response, which lacks candor and specificity, creates the impression that she knew about the bankruptcy but did not inform the court. . . .

Put frankly, [EsNtion’s] counsel “dodged a bullet” when the court decided not to personally sanction her [in connection with the Court’s earlier opinion].  Her attitude in her response, however, has not improved.  Rather than stepping up to the plate and admitting responsibility, she refers to extraneous matters, such as her status as a solo practitioner and the length of time that [TM Studios’] Motion for Attorney’s Fees was pending.   The court has grown weary of her excuses.  [EsNtion’s] counsel, however, will not be sanctioned because she states that she did not know of her client’s bankruptcy until only “recently,” and the court has no means of proving otherwise. . . .

The court will not hear or entertain any more excuses from [EsNtion’s counsel]. The court has been quite patient, but it does not have the patience of Job; it has heard enough! [EsNtion’s counsel] does not seem to recognize her predicament, but the following aphorism should put the matter in perspective:  “When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.”  Further excuses or argument from [EsNtion’s counsel] regarding the substantive issue of attorney’s fees, or her conduct relating thereto, may lead the court to sua sponte reconsider its earlier decision with respect to her personal liability for attorney’s fees in this case, or to impose sanctions as it deems appropriate for violation of its order.

All around, not a good situation to be in.

TM Studios is represented in the case by Bruce Morris, Danya Blair, and Sarah Davis, all of Beirne Maynard & Parsons LLP.

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IonLoop Sues Colantotte International for Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity

On September 17, 2010, IonLoop filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against Colantotte International.  The lawsuit requests a declaratory judgment that U.S. Patent No. 6,913,663 is invalid, unenforceable and not infringed by IonLoop.  IonLoop also claims that Colantotte International falsely marked its products with the ‘633 patent.  The patent-in-suit relates to a method of manufacturing a magnetic therapeutic device.

IonLoop is represented by Scott Meyer and Thomas Jacks, both with the Dallas law firm of Chalker Flores, LLP.  The case is pending before Judge Lindsay.

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Don’t Mess With D Magazine

That’s the message coming through loud and clear in a trademark lawsuit filed on September 9, 2010 by D Magazine against Defendants Edwin Bedford, Bob Johnson, and Associated Capital Services, Inc.  D Magazine claims that Defendants, doing business as “D Moving,” use a logo that is identical or confusingly similar to D Magazine’s logo.  D Magazine asserts causes of action under the Lanham Act, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, and Texas state law.  D Magazine requests a preliminary and permanent injunction, the transfer of Defendants’ domain name (http://www.dmovingservices.com/) to D Magazine, Defendants’ profits, statutory damages of at least $100,000, treble damages, attorney’s fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest.

On its website and in its lawsuit, D Magazine notes that Defendants formerly operated “Major League Moving” until they were sued by Major League Baseball in a prior lawsuit.  Major League Baseball obtained an injunction against Defendants following a default judgment in that lawsuit.

David Harper, Jeffrey Becker, and Jason Bloom, all of Haynes and Boone, LLP, represent D Magazine.  The lawsuit is before Chief Judge Fitzwater.

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Magistrate Judge Toliver

Magistrate Judge Toliver is one of the Northern District’s Magistrate Judges.  A graduate of Howard University, she received her juris doctor from the University of Texas School of Law in 1984.  Following her graduation from law school, she served as an Assistant Regional Attorney for the Texas Department of Human Services, and as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Texas.  In 1987, Judge Toliver became an Assistant District Attorney for the Tarrant County District Attorney’s office, and, from 1995 until her appointment, she was an Assistant United States attorney.  She sits in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas.

Judge Toliver grew up in Fort Worth.  Prior to joining the bench, Judge Toliver was a noted felony prosecutor, having, among other things, tried 15 consecutive homicide cases in 1993 as the Chief of the Gang Unit in Tarrant County’s District Attorney’s office, earning her the nickname of “Murder Queen.”

Judge Toliver’s initial term runs through 2018.

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Northern District Magistrate Judge Profiles

The Northern District has nine Magistrate Judges.  Over the next couple of weeks, we’ll be profiling these judges, beginning with Magistrate Judge Toliver.  You can also access information about the Northern District judges on the following page.

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Dondi Turns 22

It has been 22 years since the Northern District sat, en banc, to issue its opinion in Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D.284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).  The case, which has been cited nearly 1,000 times, established standards of conduct for attorneys practicing in the Northern District, and is required to be read by all attorneys seeking to appear pro hac vice in the Northern District.

Five of the eleven judges who issued the Dondi opinion still sit in the Northern District (Chief Judge Fitzwater, and Judges Robinson, Fish, Maloney, and Cummings).

Given the case’s importance, we thought it beneficial to hit the highlights here.  Dondi actually involved two cases:  Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan and Knight v. Protective Life Insurance Co.  In Dondi Properties, defendants filed six motions for sanctions, complaining of “plaintiffs’ failure to answer interrogatories, failure to comply with prior orders of the court pertaining to discovery, misrepresenting facts to the court, and improperly withholding documents.”  Knight involved a motion to strike a reply brief that the defendant filed without leave of court.  (Note that, at the time Dondi was decided, leave of court was required before filing a reply brief.  Today, L.R. 7.1(f) provides for reply briefs without leave of court.)

The Northern District took the unusual step of convening en banc “for the purpose of establishing standards of litigation conduct to be observed in civil actions litigated in the Northern District of Texas.”  The Northern District summarized the problem as follows:

With alarming frequency, we find that valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in resolving unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers.  Judges and magistrates of this court are required to devote substantial attention to refereeing abusive litigation tactics that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction.  Our system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce resources to supervising matters that do not advance the resolution of the merits of a case; nor can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.

As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far different from years past.  Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice.  We now adopt standards designed to end such conduct.

The standards the Northern Districted announced, which litigation counsel must adhere to, are as follows:

(A) In fulfilling his or her primary duty to the client, a lawyer must be ever conscious of the broader duty to the judicial system that serves both attorney and client.

(B) A lawyer owes, to the judiciary, candor, diligence and utmost respect.

(C) A lawyer owes, to opposing counsel, a duty of courtesy and cooperation, the observance of which is necessary for the efficient administration of our system of justice and the respect of the public it serves.

(D) A lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration of justice, the fundamental duties of personal dignity and professional integrity.

(E) Lawyers should treat each other, the opposing party, the court, and members of the court staff with courtesy and civility and conduct themselves in a professional manner at all times.

(F) A client has no right to demand that counsel abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive conduct.  A lawyer shall always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration.

(G) In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer’s conduct, attitude, or demeanor towards opposing lawyers.

(H) A lawyer should not use any form of discovery, or the scheduling of discovery, as a means of harassing opposing counsel or counsel’s client.

(I) Lawyers will be punctual in communications with others and in honoring scheduled appearances, and will recognize that neglect and tardiness are demeaning to the lawyer and to the judicial system.

(J) If a fellow member of the Bar makes a just request for cooperation, or seeks scheduling accommodation, a lawyer will not arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent.

(K) Effective advocacy does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior and members of the Bar will adhere to the higher standard of conduct which judges, lawyers, clients, and the public may rightfully expect.

The Court noted that “[m]alfeasant counsel can expect instead that their conduct will prompt an appropriate response from the court, including the range of sanctions . . . in the Rule 11 context: a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances.” (citations and quotations omitted).

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