Fuel Tech Sues Panasia for Patent Infringement

On September 29, 2010, Fuel Tech, Inc. filed suit (pdf copy of the complaint here) against Panasia Co., accusing Panasia of committing patent infringement.  The patent-in-suit is United States Patent No. 7,090,810, which relates to a process for reducing the NOx content in combustion gases expelled from a large-scale stationary combustor.  Fuel Tech accuses Panasia of committing willful infringement, and seeks monetary damages (including enhanced damages and attorney’s fees) and an injunction.

The case is before Judge Solis.

Fuel Tech is represented by Kelly Kubasta, Darin Klemchuk, and Kirby Drake, all of Dallas’ Klemchuk Kubasta LLP; and Thomas Ross, Michael Weiner, Sandip Patel, Jonathan Goodman, all of Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP.

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Lawsuit Against Bryan Cave LLP Survives Motion to Dismiss

On September 27, 2010, Judge Boyle of the Northern District of Texas allowed two counts in plaintiffs’ amended complaint to go forward against Bryan Cave LLP and American Express Tax and Business Services (pdf copy of the decision here).  The plaintiffs have sued Bryan Cave and American Express Tax and Business Services for “alleged negligent misrepresentations and omissions in various opinion letters concerning the risks associated with using specially designed insurance policies to fund pension plans.”  Judge Boyle dismissed plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy and aiding/abetting common-law fraud claim, but determined that plaintiffs’ sufficiently alleged their negligent misrepresentation and exemplary damages claims. 

The plaintiff is represented by Eric Madden and Brandon Lewis, of Diamond McCarthy LLP.  

Defendant Bryan Cave LLP is represented by Kelly Vickers, of Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP; and Douglas Whitney and John Litwinski, of McDermott Will & Emery LLP

Defendant American Express Tax & Business Services Inc. is represented by Darla Stockton Roden of Andrews Kurth LLP.

Indianapolis Life Insurance Company is represented by, among others, Jeffrey Tillotson and Edward Jason Dennis, of Lynn Tillotson Pinker & Cox LLP

Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Company is represented by David Jones, Ashley Street, Barry Chasnoff, Michelle Reed, and Jessica Taylor, of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld; and Dan Marmalefsky, David McDowell, and Rebekah Kaufman, of Morrison & Foerster LLP.

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EEOC Sues Monarch Dental for Sex Discrimination

On September 22, 2010, the EEOC sued Monarch Dental in the Northern District of Texas “to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and to provide relief” to two female Monarch Dental employees (pdf copy of complaint here).  The EEOC’s complaint asserts that the “Lead Dentist” of Monarch Dental’s Burleson location subjected his female dental assistants to unwanted sexual conduct by, among other things, touching them in a sexual manner and making sexual comments about female patients.  The EEOC seeks, among other things, an injunction prohibiting Monarch Dental from engaging in further acts of sex discrimination. 

The case is before Judge Kinkeade.

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Magistrate Judge Lane (Retired)

Magistrate Judge Lane (retired) was born in San Angelo, Texas.  His tenure on the bench began in 1971, as a part-time Magistrate Judge.  In 2003, Judge Lane became a full-time Magistrate Judge.  From 1969 until he became a full-time Magistrate Judge, Judge Lane practiced law in the law firm of Marshall, Hall, McLaughlin & Lane, of San Angelo, Texas.

He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy (B.S. 1961), and earned his law degree from the University of Texas School of Law (J.D. 1968).

Judge Lane served our country as a pilot in the United States Air Force.  His chambers are located in Abilene, Texas.

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You Lose Some, You Win Some

Last week, we noted that the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC’s Complaint adequately stated a claim against Mark Cuban for insider trading.  In that case, the SEC filed suit against Cuban in the Northern District of Texas, accusing him of insider trading.  Last week, another decision came out relating to the Cuban case.  This decision (pdf copy available here) was issued by Judge Walton from the District of Columbia, and involves a lawsuit Cuban filed against the SEC seeking certain records pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request relating to purported misconduct at the SEC and an SEC employee who, according to Cuban, used his government e-mail system to harass Cuban.  The decision appears to be largely in Cuban’s favor.

A couple of interesting things to note from the decision:

  1. The decision relates to a December 2008 Freedom of Information Act request by Cuban.  If you need records from the federal government for one of your cases and intend to seek them pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, seek such records as soon as possible.  Otherwise, you might end up receiving them far too late for any use in your case.
  2. There are many governmental records that are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (the court discusses various exemptions in great detail). 
  3. The SEC sought “three additional years” to review 107 boxes of documents (the court denied this request).  We doubt that the SEC would allow a company being investigated by the SEC to take three years to search through 100 boxes of documents (i.e., a relatively small amount of documents for any complicated civil case these days). 

Cuban was represented in the District of Columbia by David Ross, of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, and Lyle Roberts, of Dewey & Leboeuf LLP.

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Wal-Mart Wins Dismissal With Prejudice After Filing Successful Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

In a recent order (pdf copy here) in Salinas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Judge Lindsay granted Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss.  Salinas had sued Wal-Mart, claiming that she slipped and fell in one of Wal-Mart’s Dallas stores, and that Wal-Mart’s negligence was to blame.  Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss asserted that Salinas’ complaint failed to state a claim because she filed suit more than two years after the incident occurred, and, accordingly, her suit was barred by Texas’ two year statute of limitations for personal injury cases.  Judge Lindsay agreed, finding that Salinas filed her complaint five days late. 

Judge Lindsay noted that Salinas did not file a response to Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss. 

Wal-Mart was represented by Ramona Martinez and Stacy Hoffman Bruce, both of Cobb Martinez Woodward PLLC.

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Court Sentences Spoliator of Evidence to Two Years in Prison

Occasionally, we discuss non-Northern District of Texas cases of importance to litigators in federal court.  The court’s recent decision (pdf copy here) in Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe (D. Md.) is one that all litigators should be familiar with.  The court’s decision is notable for at least six reasons.

First, the Court found that the Mark Pappas, the President of Defendant Creative Pipe, committed pervasive and willful violations of several Court orders to preserve and produce electronically stored information (“ESI”), and ordered that he be imprisoned for a period of time not to exceed two years, unless and until he pays to Victor Stanley the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Victor Stanley as the prevailing party under Rule 37.  The court found that Pappas had committed eight discrete violations:

(1) failed to implement a litigation hold;

(2) deleted ESI soon after [plaintiff] filed suit;

(3) failed to preserve his external hard drive after Plaintiff demanded preservation of ESI;

(4) failed to preserve files and emails after Plaintiff demanded their preservation;

(5) deleted ESI after the Court issued its first preservation order;

(6) continued to delete ESI and used programs to permanently remove files after the Court admonished the parties of their duty to preserve evidence and issued its second preservation order;

(7) failed to preserve ESI when he replaced the [a] server; and

(8) further used programs to permanently delete ESI after the Court issued numerous production orders.

The court’s 89 page decision summarizes the violations in great detail, and concludes by stating:  “Collectively, they constitute the single most egregious example of spoliation that I have encountered in any case that I have handled or in any case described in the legion of spoliation cases I have read in nearly fourteen years on the bench.”

Second, the court noted that Creative Pipe had “acquiesced” in the entry of a default judgment with regard to Victor Stanley’s flagship copyright claim (Victor Stanley basically asserted that Creative Pipe, its competitor, downloaded Victor Stanley’s copyrighted material for use in Creative Pipe’s business).

Third, the court noted that it could initiate criminal contempt proceedings against a party for spoliation of ESI in a civil case.

Fourth, the court painstakingly summarizes spoliation law as it exists in the various circuits, including the potential spoliation sanctions that can be imposed.

Fifth, the court noted that Victor Stanley had requested that the court refer the matter to the United States Attorney to evaluate whether perjury or other criminal charges should be brought against Pappas.  The court noted that this avenue was available to it, but ultimately declined to refer the matter, writing:

I have given serious thought to doing this, because I have concluded that Pappas, and through him, CPI, engaged in multiple willful acts of destruction of evidence and lied under oath in affidavits, deposition testimony, and before the Court during the hearings it held.  Knowing, however, the existing demands on the U.S. Attorney’s office to prosecute very serious crimes, as well as their available resources, I do not think it probable that they would agree to initiate a criminal case arising out of a factually-complicated civil case involving an inordinately voluminous record, and concerning highly technical issues that will necessitate expert testimony.

Sixth, the court found that Pappas had committed civil contempt of court which was established by clear and convincing evidence.  The court’s sanction, as noted above, was that Pappas should be imprisoned for a period of time not to exceed two years, unless and until he pays to Victor Stanley the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Victor Stanley.  With respect to the sanctions being civil as opposed to criminal, the court stated:

Despite the fact that, if Pappas refuses to pay the attorney’s fees and costs ordered by the Court, he will be imprisoned for two years, it is quite clear that this is a civil—not a criminal—contempt sanction, because the relief is compensatory and the sanction will be imposed to coerce Pappas’s compliance with this Court’s order to pay attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff; Pappas can avoid imprisonment by promptly paying the fees and costs.  This result is absolutely essential as a civil contempt sanction because, without it, I am convinced that Pappas will do all that he can to avoid paying any money judgment or award of attorney’s fees that is in the form of a civil judgment alone.  Without the threat of jail time, Pappas’s future conduct would be predicted by his past, and Plaintiff will receive a paper judgment that does not enable it to recover its considerable out-of-pocket losses caused by Pappas’s spoliation. To avoid jail time, all that is required of Pappas is to pay Plaintiff the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Plaintiff for prevailing on this motion.

Victor Stanley is represented by Randell Ogg, of Bode and Grenier LLP, and Robert  Wolinsky, of Hogan Lovells.

Creative Pipe is currently represented by Jeffrey Orenstein, of Goren, Wolff & Orenstein, and Orenstein LLC, and Joshua Kaufman, of Venable LLP.  (Note that the court specifically remarked that such counsel did not represent Creative Pipe during the times when the conduct resulting in spoliation of evidence took place.)


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Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth Sues Reverend Jack Iker

On September 21, 2010, the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth (“EDFW”) filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Rt. Rev. Jack Leo Iker, who, according to EDFW, “withdraw from The Episcopal Church and pledged his allegiance to a different denomination.”  EDFW claims that Rev. Iker is using EDFW’s service marks in his advertising and marketing of religious services and works, and that individuals may mistakenly believe that Rev. Iker’s religious services are being provided by EDFW.  EDFW asserts causes of action for service mark infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act, and seeks to recover its damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.

EDFW is represented by Jonathan David Fulton Nelson, of Jonathan D. F. Nelson, P.C., and William Sims, Jr., Allen Yee, and Thomas Leatherbury, all of Vinson & Elkins LLP.

The case is before Judge Means.

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File Your Lawsuits Quickly

Judge Boyle, on September 16, 2010, entered a stay in Excentus Corp. v. The Kroger CoExcentus filed its lawsuit in the Northern District against Kroger (asserting infringement of three patents relating to fuel rewards) two hours and six minutes after Kroger sued Excentus in the Southern District of Ohio (seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the same three patents, as well as additional Excentus patents).  Apparently, the lawsuits followed a break down in licensing discussions between the parties.

Judge Boyle stayed the Northern District lawsuit pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s “first-to-file” rule, which holds that “when two related cases are pending in two district courts, the court with the later-filed action can refuse to hear the case if the issues raised by both cases ‘substantially overlap.’”  Judge Boyle noted that “[o]nce the court in the later-filed action finds the issues involved are likely to substantially overlap, it is up to the first-filed court to resolve the question of whether both cases should proceed.”

Judge Boyle found that there was substantial overlap between the two actions, despite Excentus amending its complaint to add causes of action for misappropriation and theft of trade secrets, common law misappropriation, and imposition of a constructive trust.  Judge Boyle further found that the “first-to-file” rule applies even where the two suits were filed only hours apart.  And, while Judge Boyle noted that the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the filing of an action for declaratory judgment in direct anticipation of being sued often negates the “first-to-file” rule, this was not a case where Kroger filed the Ohio suit for an “improper or abusive” reason.  Accordingly, Judge Boyle held that the Northern District case would be stayed until the Ohio court determined which action should proceed.

Excentus is represented in this matter by Brett Govett and Karl Dial, both of Fulbright & Jaworski LLPMark Howland, Lon Outland, and Mark Ziegelbein, all of Jones Day, represent Kroger.

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Car Smart, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Denied

Judge Fish, on September 20, 2010, denied Car Smart, Inc.’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Santander Consumer USA v. Car SmartSantander is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas County.  Car Smart is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.   After removing the case from state to federal court, Car Smart filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Santander’s lawsuit claimed that Car Smart breached a non-recourse dealer retail agreement (the “Agreement”).  Judge Fish provided a nice summary of the law of personal jurisdiction as follows: 

A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction by the forum state is consistent with due process under the United States Constitution.  A defendant is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in diversity to the same extent that it would be amenable to the jurisdiction of a state court in the same forum.  Applying state law, this court must first determine whether Texas, the forum state, could assert long-arm jurisdiction.  Because the Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution, the court need only concern itself with the federal due process inquiry.  

Due process requires the satisfaction of two elements to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) the nonresident must have some minimum contact with the forum that results from an affirmative act on its part such that the nonresident defendant could anticipate being haled into the courts of the forum state; and (2) it must be fair or reasonable to require the nonresident to defend the suit in the forum state.  The Due Process Clause ensures that persons have a “fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”

To establish minimum contacts with the forum, a nonresident defendant must do some act by which it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”  However, the unilateral activity of one asserting a relationship with the nonresident defendant does not satisfy this requirement. . . .

Two types of in personam jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.  Specific jurisdiction exists if the cause of action is related to, or arises out of, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and those contacts meet the due process standard.  When a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on contacts with the forum related to the particular controversy, the court is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction.  General jurisdiction, on the other hand, may be found when the nonresident’s contacts with the forum are “continuous and systematic,” even though the claim is unrelated to those contacts.

 (citations and quotations omitted).

            Car Smart’s motion basically claimed that it had no connection to Texas.  Notably, Car Smart stated that “it does not have a copy of the ‘alleged’ Agreement[,]” but that “[i]f the Agreement exists, Car Smart negotiated its terms entirely from Pennsylvania and signed it in Pennsylvania.”  (Car Smart’s argument seems to be similar to the ol’ “I didn’t kill him, but, if I did, it was in self-defense” defense.)  Judge Fish rejected Car Smart’s argument, ruling:

By entering into a continuing relationship with Santander, a resident of Texas, Car Smart was purposefully availing itself of the privileges and protections of doing business in Texas.  This availment should have alerted Car Smart to the possibility that it might be haled into court in Texas to answer complaints related to this extended contractual relationship.  Although Car Smart argues to the contrary, the continuation of the relationship between the parties for over four years, combined with Car Smart’s decision to enter into 28 agreements with Santander, suggests otherwise.

Santander is represented by Donald Hill of Rowlett Hill LLP.  Car Smart is represented by Darrell Guthrie, Greg Dimmick, and Lawrence Doss, all of Mullin Hoard & Brown.

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