Judge Ferguson Denies Motion for Clarification in General Electric v. Mitsubishi

Posted on August 9, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 6, 2012, Judge Ferguson issued an Order (available here) denying General Electric’s motion for clarification in General Electric v. Mitsubishi.  Judge Ferguson had, in connection with the upcoming inequitable conduct bench trial in this patent infringement case, directed the parties to “submit in writing the direct testimony to be offered in evidence no later than fourteen days before trial begins.” GE argued that because Mitsubishi carries the burden of proof regarding inequitable conduct, “a staggered exchange of the narratives is merited.”  More specifically, GE argued that:

the Court should require Mitsubishi to provide GE with its witnesses’ narratives twenty-one days before the trial, and allow GE to provide its witnesses’ narratives to Mitsubishi fourteen days before the trial. Otherwise, GE argues, “GE will be in the unenviable position of having to guess, based on Mitsubishi’s pleadings, discovery responses, and expert reports, what evidence Mitsubishi will include in its direct examinations, so that GE can include in its own witness statements all of the evidence that is necessary to rebut it.”

Mitsubishi argued in response that “GE’s proposed ‘staggered exchange’ is both a violation of the rule of sequestration and bestows an unfair advantage on GE.”

Judge Ferguson resolved the parties’ dispute as follows:

While the Court agrees with GE that if the Court’s rule were not in place, GE would have the benefit of witnessing Mitsubishi’s case in chief prior to presenting its own, the party without the burden always prepares a rebuttal case in advance of trial with the help of the other side’s “pleadings, discovery responses, and expert reports” and without the benefit of having access to the opposing party’s witness testimony. Requiring Mitsubishi to give GE its witness narratives one week before the deadline applicable to both parties would give GE an advantage in preparing its case that it would not have but for the Court’s procedural rule. Accordingly, GE’s Motion is DENIED. All parties will submit their direct-testimony narratives fourteen days in advance of trial. However, in order to streamline the process, Mitsubishi is ORDERED to provide GE with a list of all prior art about which it will present evidence and all individuals whom it claims withheld material information from the PTO by August 29, 2012. During trial, the Court will give both parties a limited opportunity to conduct direct examinations of its witnesses as needed for rebuttal.

GE is represented by Ray Guy, Anish Desai, Carmen Bremer, David Lender, and Eric Hochstadt, all of Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP; and Andrew Brown, David Ball, Jr., Moses Silverman, and Nicholas Groombridge, all of Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP; and formerly represented by Christopher Evans, now of Shore Chan Bragalone DePumpo LLP.

Mitsubishi is represented by Vic Henry and Lane Fletcher, both of Henry Oddo Austin & Fletcher; and Alice Loughran, Andrew Sloniewsky, Charles Cole, Emily Nestler, Filiberto Agusti, Houda Morad, Martin Schneiderman, Patricia Palacios, Seth Watkins, Shannen Coffin, Steven Barber, and Tremayne Norris, all of Steptoe & Johnson LLP; and Cortney Alexander, Gerald Ivey, Jeffrey Totten, Naoki Yoshida, Roger Taylor, Thomas Jenkins, Thomas Winland,  Tyler Akagi, and Virginia Carron, all of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner LLP.

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Magistrate Judge Ramirez Issues Important Patent Infringement Contentions Decision

Posted on August 8, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 2, 2012, Magistrate Judge Ramirez issued “findings, conclusion, and recommendation” in H-W Technology v. Apple, Inc. et al relating to H-W Technology’s infringement contentions (decision available here).  Defendant Google had filed a motion to strike H-W Technology’s supplemental infringement contentions, and Judge Ramirez found that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

After H-W Technology served its infringement contentions, Google pointed out what it considered to be deficiencies in the contentions, and H-W Technology thereafter served supplemental infringement contentions.  Google claimed that the Court should strike the supplemental infringement contentions for three reasons: (1) the supplemental infringement contentions fail to provide notice of Plaintiff’s specific theories of infringement; (2) the identification of the accused instrumentalities is not “as specific as possible”; and (3) the claim chart does not identify specifically and in detail where each element of each asserted claim is found within each accused instrumentality.

Judge Ramirez noted the following about the Northern District of Texas’ patent rules (found in Amended Misc. Order No. 62):

  • “The rules, like other local patent rules, are designed specifically to require parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation so as to prevent the shifting sands approach to claim construction.
  • “The purpose of preliminary infringement contentions is to provide notice of the accusing party’s specific theories of infringement.  This notice focuses discovery and narrows issues for claim construction, summary judgment, and trial.
  • “Infringement contentions are not meant to require a party to prove its case of infringement or provide a forum for litigation of the substantive issues, however.  [T]hey are merely designed to streamline the discovery process.” (citations and quotations omitted).

Turning to Google’s assertions, Judge Ramirez found as follows:

Infringement By Sale of Another Company’s Products.  Although Google had argued that H-W Technology had not provided any basis for its allegations of Google’s infringement of another company’s products (Nexus X and Nexus One, manufactured by Samsung and HTC, respectively), Judge Ramirez noted that “Google does not have to manufacture the accused instrumentalities to be liable under § 271, and may be found liable simply for selling or offering to sell a patented invention without authority. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). As Plaintiff’s supplemental infringement contentions, in part, accuse Google of selling or offering to sell the accused products, they have specified a basis for Google’s alleged infringement of Nexus S and Nexus One.”

Identification of Infringing Products. Google had also argued that H-W Technology’s supplemental infringement contentions “do not identify the products by model, manufacturer, or version, and therefore fail to satisfy the requirement that the identification of the accused instrumentalities be ‘as specific as possible.’”  Judge Ramirez rejected Google’s argument, finding that, “[a]lthough Misc. Order No. 62 requires that the accused instrumentalities be as specific as possible, it goes on to explain that each accused instrumentality must be identified by ‘name or model number, if known.’ Id., ¶ 3-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff has met this requirement by identifying the names of the accused instrumentalities. Nothing more is required by the plain language of Misc. Order No. 62.”

Specificity and Detail of Claim Chart.  Judge Ramirez reviewed H-W Technology’s claim chart and noted that it had omitted one of the accused instrumentalities (Nexus One) altogether, failed to “identify the Android operating system anywhere,” and “merely recites language from the claims at issue without providing any support for some of their elements.”  H-W Technology argued, among other things, that it had adequately put Google on notice of H-W Technology’s infringement theories (in its contentions and during a pre-suit meeting with Google at Google’s headquarters), and that “Google’s claimed confusion is disingenuous at best because Google is one of the most sophisticated technology companies in the world with attorneys having engineering degrees from Ivy League schools[.]” H-W Technology “further contends that at a basic level, this is a simple case that involves the use of Google software to perform certain functions on Google-branded smartphones, and that a simple reading of the 955 patent compared to the accused products makes it abundantly clear what is at stake.”

Judge Ramirez rejected H-W Technology’s arguments:

Although its claim chart recites language from the claims at issue and provides corresponding images with some textual explanations, it still falls short of “identifying specifically and in detail where each element of each asserted claim is found within each accused instrumentality.” Misc. Order No. 62, ¶ 3-1(a)(3). Plaintiff has the burden of providing infringement contentions that identify specifically and in detail where each claim element is found in the accused products, “so that the Court can make a principled decision on whether discovery will proceed.” See Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., 2010 WL 1135762, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010). Simply asserting that attorneys with engineering degrees from Ivy League schools who work for one of the most sophisticated technology companies in the world would understand the infringement contentions is not sufficient. See id. Likewise, Plaintiff’s assertion that it presented its infringement contentions to Google is also insufficient because it does not show that the infringement contentions actually served on Google, and required by Misc. Order No. 62, are of sufficient specificity. The substance of Plaintiff’s presentation to Google is not a matter of record. Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that merely putting Google on notice of its infringement theories complies with the requirement of a claim chart with specific and detailed infringement contentions is unpersuasive.

Accordingly, Judge Ramirez found that H-W Technology’s supplemental contentions were deficient and failed to comply with the patent rules.

Judge Ramirez then took up the issue of whether the supplemental contentions should be stricken under Rule 16(f) for failure to comply with the patent rules.  According to Judge Ramirez, “The tests for determining whether to allow a party to supplement infringement contentions and for determining whether to strike infringement contentions are essentially the same. A court must consider the following factors: (1) the reason for the delay and whether the party has been diligent; (2) the importance of what the court is excluding and the availability of lesser sanctions; (3) the danger of unfair prejudice; and (4) the availability of a continuance and the potential impact of a delay on judicial proceedings.” (citations and quotations omitted).

After considering each factor, Judge Ramirez found that H-W Technology’s infringement contentions regarding Nexus One (the product H-W Technology failed to chart) should be stricken, and that H-W Technology would be allowed 30 days (from the date of the order accepting Judge Ramirez’s recommendation) to file amended infringement contentions with respect to the remaining accused instrumentalities that comply with Amended Misc. Order No. 62. Judge Ramirez offered the following guidance for H-W Technology when drafting its amended infringement contentions:

The amended infringement contentions should identify each accused instrumentality as specifically as possible, and assert any infringement theories clearly and specifically. The amended infringement contentions should also include a claim chart covering each of the accused instrumentalities. If certain portions of the chart are applicable to more than one of the accused instrumentalities, the claim chart should clearly indicate as such. The claim chart should further identify as specifically as possible (in terms of name, model, version, or manufacturer) the representative products being analyzed. Finally, the claim chart should identify specifically and in detail where each element of each asserted claim is found within each accused instrumentality, keeping in view the deficiencies pointed out in these findings, conclusions, and recommendation.

(Judge Ramirez indicated that, although Google had only moved to strike the infringement contentions, its motion “may be construed as a motion to strike as well as an alternative motion to compel more detailed infringement contentions.”)

H-W Technology is represented by Winston Huff and Arthur Navarro, both of Navarro Huff PLLC.

Google is represented by Craig Tyler, Robin Brewer, and Stefani Shanberg, all of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.

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Home Instead Files Trademark Infringement Lawsuit in Northern District of Texas

Posted on August 8, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 6, 2012, Home Instead hit Q&A Health Services, L.L.C., DFW Community Connect, L.L.C., 1st DFW Community Connection, Inc., 1st Q&A Health Services, Inc., Regenia H. Butler f/k/a Regenia H. Armstrong, and Christy Hafford (“defendants”) with a trademark infringement lawsuit (complaint available here).  Home Instead claims that it is in the business of providing “non-medical companionship and domestic care services for senior citizens.”  Home Instead, according to the complaint, “identifies [its unique management and business system for non-medical companionship and domestic care services] by means of certain valid and legally protected federal trademarks, service marks, logos, and other commercial symbols, including, but not limited to, HOME INSTEAD® and HOME INSTEAD SENIOR CARE®[.]”

Defendants, according to Home Instead, conspired with one of its former franchisees to “compete with Home Instead’s franchised businesses, misappropriate Home Instead’s trade secrets, and assist [the franchisee] to evade [its] contractual obligations to Home Instead”; misappropriated Home Instead’s trade secrets; and violated the Lanham Act by “passing off” their services as Home Instead’s.  Home Instead seeks, among other things, damages (including punitive damages), attorney’s fees, and an injunction.

Judge Godbey has been assigned the case.

Home Instead is represented by Deborah Coldwell, Laura Warrick, and William White, all of Haynes & Boone LLP; and Adam Barney, Theresa Koller, and Trenten Bausch, all of Cline Williams Wright Johnson & Oldfather LLP.

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Twelve Tips to Become a Great Law Firm Associate

Posted on August 5, 2012 by Steven Callahan

Nearly everyone at a law firm was an associate at one point in his or her career, and some played (or play) the part better than others.  Here are twelve things that, in our opinion, make an associate great.

Be Available And Responsive.  Partners expect you to be available pretty much 24/7, because, as noted below, one of your jobs is to make them look good, and they want to look good all of the time.  Check your e-mail and cell phone voicemails at night and on the weekend, and be prepared to work late at night or on the weekend.  Respond promptly to other attorneys’ questions and communications.  Set an out of office notification if you’re in a deposition, court, or on vacation, so that those you’re working with will know when you’ll likely get back to them.                

Don’t Be Helpless.  If a partner asks you to draft and serve a subpoena, or a 30(b)(6) notice, etc., don’t say right away, “I’ve never done this before.  Can you show me how to do it?”  Take good notes as to what the partner wants, then figure out how to do it.  Show some initiative and read the applicable federal rule, research the subject matter on Lexis/Westlaw, discuss the project with a more senior associate, etc.  Don’t immediately ask for help from the partner who assigned you the project.  There’s a good chance that the partner himself doesn’t know how to do the project (e.g., “serve Defendant A in South Korea through the Hague”), or, if he does, he doesn’t have the time to explain how to do it to you (it would often take him more time to explain it to you than to do it himself).

Know How To Perform Support Staff Functions.  You should know how to operate a fax machine, pdf a document, electronically Bates-label or redact a document with Adobe, and operate the copier machine.  In many instances, you’ll be working late at night or on the weekend with a partner, and you’ll be the one expected to perform these tasks.  Or, there may be many times that your support staff isn’t available during the day that your big brief is due to be filed.  And, in other cases, you may have to fix your support staff’s mess-ups.

Make Your Time Entries Spotless.  There is nothing worse than reviewing bills, a task typically assigned to younger partners.  It can take hours to review a single bill.  As an associate, make sure that your time entries do not need to be edited.  That means, at a minimum, no spelling errors and full time entries (e.g., “telephone conference with A. Partner regarding temporary injunction research,” not “telephone conference.”).  Also, know your clients’ policies regarding outside counsel bills.  Many clients won’t think twice about paying for a 9 hour time entry for a day spent legal researching the Erie doctrine, but will fly off the handle at a $5.75 charge for a bagel and a coffee that shouldn’t have been billed.  Others refuse to pay for entries that are “block billed.”

Turn in Perfect Work.  Assume that anything you turn in to a partner could be immediately forwarded to a client or filed with a court.  Don’t put qualifiers in your cover e-mail like, “I wasn’t able to spend as much time on this as I would’ve liked” as nobody likes to see such things and it’s basically an (advance) excuse for poor work product.

Don’t Turn Down Work.  Never turn down work (subject to the qualification immediately below).  When you turn down work, a partner will have to either find someone else to do the work, or do it herself, neither of which she wants to do (since she contacted you to do it).  The partner has already formed a belief in her mind that you are the right person for the job.  Don’t let her down.

Turn Down Work If You Truly Cannot Get It Done.  The only thing worse than turning down work is accepting work and then not getting it done in time or turning in bad work product, both of which will require the partner to do the work himself or to find someone else to do the work—unacceptable outcomes for the partner, which he’ll blame you for.  So, if you can’t produce great work product on time when asked to handle a project, explain to the partner that you’d really like to help but you have too much on your plate already.  In certain instances, you can suggest to the partner that he or she discuss your workload with the other partners you’re working with (i.e., that if your help was truly necessary, the partner could discuss your workload with other partners and rearrange your work flow).  You can also offer to help find someone else to do the work you were slated to do.

Take Charge of a Case / Your Assignments.  Sometimes, it’s tempting to be an automaton and just do the minimum amount required of you.  It involves less thought, and certainly less effort, to simply do the project assigned to you, go home, and never think about the project or case again.  But that’s taking a short cut, and you should strive to make yourself indispensable to those you work with.  For instance, if you’re assigned to research issue A, and in the process you notice issues B and C, raise such issues with your colleagues.  Others on your case may be on many, many cases, and may not have the time that you have to devote to the issue or the case.  Or, if you serve a subpoena on a third party, take charge and make sure the date for the deposition is calendared and ask the partner running the case if she’d like you to take the deposition (or help prepare for it).  Volunteer to respond to the summary judgment motion that came in.  Be the master of the case’s facts or law.  Relatedly, when assigned a project, know when the deadline is and stay in contact with the partner who assigned the project.  Don’t require the partner to hound you about your progress, whether you’ll meet the deadline, etc.

Speak Up Once.  The practice of law is an art and not a science.  This means that, for any given problem or issue, there may be many “correct” ways to handle it.  You may not agree with how a partner intends to handle a situation.  You can, and should, offer your opinion on how best to deal with a problem.  But once you’ve offered your opinion, be quiet.  (There are very limited exceptions to this piece of advice, mostly dealing with ethical requirements; but if ethics aren’t implicated—and they are not in the vast majority of instances—then say your opinion once and then let it go.)  Nobody wants the know-it-all associate to constantly repeat his or her opinions.        

Make Partners Look Good.  We’ve heard it been said that, as an associate, your clients are the partners.  There’s a lot of truth to that.  One of the main reasons for your existence is to make partners look good—good in front of clients, the court, opposing counsel, etc.  Don’t feed them factual or legal information that is wrong, because it’s unlikely that they’ll have time to check your work product.  Be available whenever you are needed.  Take charge of the case, and follow the other tips in this post.  Doing so will help both yourself and the partners you’re working for.

Don’t Expect the Work to be Glamorous, But Learn From The Work You’re Tasked With.  In The Karate Kid, Mr. Miyagi agrees to teach Daniel-san karate.  Mr. Miyagi tells Daniel-san, “We make sacred pact. I promise teach karate to you, you promise learn. I say, you do, no questions.”  Mr. Miyagi then assigns Daniel-san to a series of seemingly meaningless, mundane tasks—sanding the floor, painting the fence, painting the house, and waxing cars—that take Daniel-san four full days to complete.  Daniel-san eventually has enough, and confronts Mr. Miyagi, accusing Mr. Miyagi of not teaching karate but of making Daniel-san a slave.  Mr. Miyagi then tells Daniel-san to “show me wax-on wax-off” and Mr. Miyagi throws punches at Daniel-san, which Daniel-san expertly fends off with the “wax-on wax-off” technique that Mr. Miyagi had taught him to wax cars with.  Mr. Miyagi then does the same thing with “paint the fence,” “sand the floor,” etc., and Daniel-san comes to the realization that Mr. Miyagi has taught him a whole lot of karate over the four days.  (Clip of the movie available here.)

The practice of law is a lot like The Karate Kid.  Although it’s a shame to say, when you graduate from law school after paying well-over $100,000, you don’t have the slightest clue about how to practice law.  (Personally, we believe that a lot of this is attributable to the fact that approximately half of all law school professors never practiced law at all, and nearly all of them are not currently practicing.  Could you imagine if you were taught in medical school by a professor who had never stepped foot inside of a hospital?)  You’ll be assigned a bunch of projects by the partners at your firm, and hardly any of them will be glamorous.  For example, you could be assigned to draft and have a subpoena served on a third party witness.  And you won’t have the slightest clue about how to go about doing this, because law school doesn’t teach you such things.  But you’ll read Rule 45, find the correct form, fill it out, find a process server, and arrange for service.  And then, from that point on, you’ll be an expert at serving subpoenas.

After performing hundreds of tasks like this (e.g., answering complaints, drafting expert reports, researching arcane questions of law, drafting 30(b)(6) notices, interviewing witnesses, taking depositions, drafting declarations, filing motions in limine, etc.), you’ll be well on your way to being a “real” lawyer and knowing how to practice law and run a case from its beginning, through trial and appeal. And if you learn from all of the projects you are assigned, you’ll be able to best the Cobra Kai at the All Valley Championship with a crane kick.

Don’t Be Schlocky.  “Schlockiness” is caused by incompetence, laziness, or both.  Things that make you look schlocky (and that we see all of the time) include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Filing a brief with missing citations (e.g., “Smith Decl. at ¶ __.”).
  • Not using proper Bluebook citation form.
  • Not pinpointing your case cites.
  • Fully justifying the body of your brief, but not the footnotes (or vice versa).
  • “Replying all” when you really only meant to hit “reply.”  (Sending an “internal” communication to opposing counsel is the worst form of this.)
  • Sending an e-mail saying, “Attached please find . . .” but forgetting to attach the attachment.
  • Attaching the wrong attachment.
  • Putting a method of service in your certificate of service that won’t be used (e.g., “the foregoing document was served by first class mail on any counsel who is not registered on ECF”).
  • When electronically signing your name (i.e., “/s/ John Doe”) having two lines underneath a portion of the signature instead of one.
  • Using the wrong date on your letters, briefs or discovery materials.
  • Sending out discovery without changing names from prior cases (i.e., “Party A requests that you produce your documents in 30 days” when you represented Party A two years ago and represent Party B in this case.
  • Sending a 10+MB scanned document by e-mail when it could’ve been made much smaller by printing the document to pdf.
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Williams-Pyro Files Patent Infringement Suit Against Warren Watts Technology

Posted on August 5, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 3, 2012, Williams-Pyro filed a lawsuit (available here) against Warren Watts Technology, alleging that Warren Watts infringes Williams-Pyro’s U.S. Patent No. 5,518,075, titled “Fire Extinguisher.”  Williams-Pyro claims that Brent Williams, the son of one of the founders of Williams-Pyro, worked for Williams-Pyro and became “intimately familiar with the ’075 Patent and the best selling StoveTop FireStop product.”  Brent Williams then, according to the complaint, left Williams-Pyro in 2011 to start his own company, Warren Watts.  Warrant Watts “manufactures one product:  a stovetop fire suppression product named Auto-Out.  Warren Watts’ Auto-Out product is nothing more than a ripoff of Williams-Pyro’s StoveTop FireStop product” and infringes the ’075 patent.

Williams-Pyro seeks, among other things, damages and an injunction.

Williams-Pyro is represented by J. Lyndell Kirkley and B. Dan Berryman, both of Kirkley & Berryman, L.L.P.; and Michael Anderson, of Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP.

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Copyright Infringement Suit Regarding Facebook Page Removed to Northern District of Texas

Posted on August 5, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 2, 2012, T-F Harbor removed a lawsuit brought by Sharon Lewis and Lisa Cauble (“plaintiffs”) to the Northern District of Texas.  The lawsuit (available here) alleges that T-F Harbor “maliciously contacted Facebook and had [it] remove [plaintiffs] as administrators of the Facebook Page [The Harbor Rockwall] and transfer the page and the administrator rights over to [T-F Harbor].”  The lawsuit asserts causes of action for copyright infringement, interference with existing contract, conversion, and quantum meruit.

As (correctly) noted in T-F Harbor’s removal papers, federal (not state) courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a).

Judge Fish will preside over the case.

Plaintiffs are represented by Jamie Pruitt, of The Pruitt Law Firm.

T-F Harbor is represented by Jon Hyland and Caleb Trotter, both of Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C.

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Chief Judge Fitzwater Strikes Down Farmers Branch Election System

Posted on August 3, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 2, 2012, following a bench trial, Chief Judge Fitzwater, in Fabela v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, entered an Order (available here) finding that the at-large system of electing members of the City Council of the City of Farmers Branch violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Plaintiffs contended that Farmers Branch’s system of electing City Council members at-large denies Hispanic voters the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  No Hispanic had been elected under the at-large system, and there had been at least four recent elections in which a Hispanic candidate had run for City Council and lost, despite receiving a majority of the Hispanic vote.

Judge Fitzwater agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the City of Farmers Branch to submit within 60 days a plan to remedy its violation of the Voting Rights Act.

Plaintiffs are represented by William Brewer, III, Dunham Biles, Jeremy Camp, and Nathan Pearman, all of Bickel & Brewer.

Farmers Branch is represented by Robert Heath and John Long, IV, both of Bickerstaff Heath Delgado Acosta LLP.

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Judge McBryde Denies Joint Motion for “Brief” Continuance of Trial Date

Posted on August 3, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On August 1, 2012, Judge McBryde entered an Order in JP Morgan Chase v. Hicks (available here) denying the parties’ joint motion for a “brief” continuance of trial date.  JP Morgan Chase, Hicks, HSG Sports Group, and Jacobs had asked the Court to extend the trial date by 6 weeks, with a corresponding extension to other case deadlines to “facilitate the further exchange of information through briefly extending the period for discovery, [as this extension would be] beneficial to all Parties’ understanding of the matters at issue in this litigation.”  (Joint Motion available here.)  The parties also stated that “the short extension requested in this Joint Motion will be beneficial in continuing” settlement discussions.

Judge McBryde’s Order stated that, after considering the motion, the Court believed that it should be denied (without further explanation).

JPMorgan Chase is represented by Robert Malionek, Julie Gerchik, and Wayne Flick, all of Latham & Watkins; and Michael Rochelle, of Rochelle Hutcheson & McCullough.

Jacobs is represented by Lee Morris, Joseph Wielebinski, and Phil Appenzeller, Jr., all of Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr PC; and Chris Akin, Jeffrey Tillotson, and Michael Lynn, all of Lynn Tillotson Pinker & Cox LLP.

Hicks is represented by Lewis LeClair, Brett Charhon, and Martin Robson, all of McKool Smith, P.C.

HSG Sports Group Holdings is represented by John Gaither of Neligan Foley LLP.

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Judge Solis Denies Motion to Withdraw As Counsel in Galaxy Powersports Case

Posted on July 31, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On July 25, 2012, Judge Solis denied Ufot Umana and Stanley Kuan’s motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant Benzhou Vehicle Industry Group (decision available here).  Movants had sought to withdraw as counsel after being discharged by Benzhou in March 2012, and movants and Benzhou could not effectively communicate nor agree on case strategy.  In their motion to withdraw (available here), Attorneys Umana and Kuan noted that no counsel was to be substituted in their place at the time.

Galaxy Powersports opposed the motion to withdraw, noting that the case had been on file since 2010, and that Benzhou, as a corporate entity, could not represent itself.  (Opposition available here.)  Galaxy Powersports argued that the motion for withdrawal was simply a “delay tactic.”

Judge Solis’ Order noted that the motion to withdraw was filed shortly before Galaxy Powersports filed a motion for summary judgment, and that withdrawal would significantly disrupt the prosecution of the case.  Judge Solis directed Benzhou’s counsel to respond to Galaxy Powersports’ motion for summary judgment, and stated that Benzhou’s counsel could re-urge their withdrawal motion once briefing on the summary judgment motion concluded.

Galaxy Powersports is represented by Krista Potter and Lu Pham, both of Cantey Hanger, L.L.P.

Benzhou Vehicle Industry Group is represented by Ufot Umana, of Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr P.C.; and Stanley Kuan.

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Galderma Files ANDA Suit Against Watson Pharmaceuticals in Northern District of Texas

Posted on July 31, 2012 by Steven Callahan

On July 27, 2012, Galderma Laboratories filed a lawsuit (available here) in the Northern District of Texas against Watson Pharmaceuticals.  Galderma claims that Watson submitted an ANDA (abbreviated new drug application) seeking approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, and sale of generic Adapalene and Benzoyl Peroxide Gel.  Galderma claims that this product infringes the claims of three of its patents.  Galderma seeks, among other things, damages and injunctive relief.

Galderma is represented by Michael Wilson, Jamil Alibhai, and Daniel Venglarik, all of Munck Wilson Mandala, LLP; and Aaron Fountain, Stuart Pollack, and Jeffrey Johnson, all of DLA Piper LLP.

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